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Modern Supply Chains are critical in terms of efficiency, economic activities and 
commercial impact, particularly in case of security incidents. Inland terminals, 
commercial ports and dry ports constitute key gateways for the transportation flows 
in these modern supply chains and are require enhanced security procedures. This 
paper develops a framework that facilitates the sharing of information among various 
supply chain stakeholders, which is expected to improve the security level from a 
value chain perspective. In this context, we propose the upgrade of the current 
security strategies utilizing existing processes, equipment in order to minimize time 
and cost currently needed but more importantly improving the level of security in the 
supply chain. A conceptual rule and role-based data fusion framework is developed 
enabling the seamless and timely exchange of messages. The proposed Data Fusion 
Framework has a simple architecture that supports quick integration to either 
network-based, distributed systems or conventional stand-alone systems and adheres 
to common data fusion principles. The proposed framework considers different 
components (e.g. sensors, algorithms and fusing procedures) in an equipment 
agnostic approach so as to enable easy access and easy usage of security information. 
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 Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
It is a commonplace to suggest that the logistics sector is critical in terms of economic 
activities and commercial impact when security incidents occur. In this context, inland 
terminals, commercial ports and dry ports constitute key gateways for the 
transportation flows in these supply chains, and as such there is an increased need for 
enhanced security procedures, thus being a focal point in the Supply Chain Security. 
Therefore, these gateways have to rely not only on complicated and advanced 
facilities but also on advanced ICT infrastructure, on trustworthy e-supply chain 
services and robust procedures. The degradation, interruption or impairment of 
supply chain cargo flows have serious impacts on the economy, national security, 
health, safety, and the welfare of citizens and nations; thus the main objective of any 
decision maker is to either decrease the occurrence of these events or their impact.  
This paper proposes a framework that focuses on improving the sharing of 
information among the supply chain stakeholders (agents). The proposed framework 
is expected to improve the security level of the entire supply chain. More precisely, 
the concept of this paper lies exactly on this premise, the more information becomes 
available to the decision maker, the more likely it is to minimize the probability of a 
Loss Event happening. Key success factor is the information availability, which should 
be based on specific sharing principles throughout the supply chain and to all relevant 
stakeholders. In this context upgraded security strategies may be developed upon 
existing processes minimizing time and cost currently needed but more importantly 
improving the level of security in the supply chain utilizing, even more, the existing 
security investment implemented by governmental bodies and private undertakings. 
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section a literature review provides the 
broader context of the research. Section 2 presents the conceptual data fusion 
framework and its associated groups of architecture. Section 3 concludes with some 
important observations and section 4 provides some research and policy 
recommendations.  
1.2 Literature Review  
Before we describe the supply chain security in the cargo/container movement we 
would like to cover the supply chain in general and container supply chain in particular. 
A supply chain covers all activities associated with the flow and movement of goods, 
services, and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption 
(Murphy and Wood, 2008). Currently, this flow and movement of goods, services and 
information are global in nature, transforming supply (value) chains into global supply 
(value) chains. Global supply chains are the international system of different 
entities/stakeholders including; suppliers, manufacturers, freight forwarders, logistics 
service providers, ocean carriers, buyers and custom authorities etc. that pave the way 
of international trade. Container shipping is an integral component of the 
transportation network that links the consigner and consignee and all other entities in 




Supply chain security has become a crucial element in the logistics operations and had 
gained the attention of researchers, especially after the disastrous events of 
September 11, 2001. According to Closs and McGarrell (2004) supply chain security 
management is “the application of policies, procedures, and technologies to protect 
supply chain assets (products, facilities, equipment, information, and personnel) from 
theft, damage, or terrorism, and to prevent the introduction of unauthorized 
contraband, people, or weapons of mass destruction into the supply chain”. The 
security and the safety of the transportation networks are fundamental for the 
international trade (Closs and McGarrell, 2004) that is assured through the efficient 
cargo movements, commercial relationships and integration among different 
stakeholders.   
An important element of supply chain security is cargo integrity. Cargo integrity is 
primarily affected by supply chain disruptions (Prokop, 2004), therefore security 
regulations are being adopted by authorities and agencies so as to standardize the 
security procedures to minimize the disruptions and improve the overall efficiency. 
However, the number of different regulations that each organization has to abide 
with, impact adversely transportation chains in terms of time and costs related to the 
physical movement of cargo.  The stakeholders of the security system can be broadly 
divided into four categories; customers (Buyer, importer, consignee etc.) suppliers 
(seller, exporter, consignor) authorities (customs, ports, intervention and border 
authorities) and intermediaries (freight forwarders, transport companies, brokers, 
banks, insurance providers etc.). These stakeholders are interested in optimizing their 
throughput and efficiency without compromising the reliability of the information. 
Although many supply chain stakeholders are intimidated by the new regulations, 
nevertheless, they seem to understand that these security initiatives aim to minimize 
the risk and improve the mitigation effectiveness.  
The literature on supply chain security has focused on two major streams of research. 
The first stream is technical studies that primarily focused on the development of 
appropriate equipment and/or of advanced forecasting algorithms to detect dubious 
consignments. For example, Arendt et al., (2012)  describe how the project CHINOS is 
increasing visibility and security by using innovative IT technology like RFID and 
automatic damage documentation as well as how the project INTEGRITY develops and 
implements an IT system to increase supply chain visibility. Similarly, the project 
Contain (CONTAIN Consortium, 2011) develops an innovative container device as well 
the appropriate IT infrastructure to increase security, whereas the SMART-CM project 
(SMART-CM Consortium, 2016) was one of the first Research Projects that the 
European Commission funded to address the improvement of the efficiency of the 
Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) concept. To this extent, Azaiez and Bier (2007) 
examined optimal investments in the security of multi-component systems based on 
the assumption that the defender intends to preserve the overall systemic 
functionality. 
Similarly, some studies focus on developing advanced algorithms to detect suspicious 
containers or consignments and warn the relevant authorities in advance. Yang et al., 
(2013) developed an advanced threat-based criticality analysis methodology designed 
for the identification and prioritization of vulnerable port facilities under 
uncertainties, combining fuzzy Bayesian reasoning and analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP) analysis. With respect to game-theoretic studies, a number of researchers 
 
 
(Sandler and Arce, 2003; Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Basuchoudhary and Razzolini, 
2006)) have developed advanced game theoretic models to understand the 
interactions and the reasoning behind attacking vulnerable assets.  
The other stream includes business-oriented studies which explore the value these 
regulations have on the day to day business up to the strategic level. For example, Rice 
and Spayd (2005) claim that security upgrades may bring collateral benefits such as 
trade facilitation, asset visibility following a previous argument set by Sheffi (2001). 
Willys and Ortiz (2004) argue that supply chain efficiency and security are interrelated 
in terms of reducing customs delays, increased transparency of information of goods 
flows, reducing shipping costs among others.  In this context, a number of studies have 
focused on measuring the adverse effects of security regulations on logistics 
efficiency. Mazeradi and Ekwall (2009) had shown how the implementation of the 
ISPS-code increases paperwork and slows down processes in ports. Similarly, 
Stevenson (2005) showed that the ISPS code may have a negative impact on costs and 
on the efficiency of terminals. 
Although the automated systems that are introduced aim at increasing the efficiency 
and the effectiveness of supply chain processes, there seems to be a gap in the depth 
of actual integration of these security systems. More precisely, in most of the cases, 
the information collected or disseminated is either unidirectional or siloed with 
specific stakeholders. This paper argues in favour of data fusion as a promising 
alternative to improving the security level in the supply chains, to capitalize on existing 
equipment and security investment as well as improve the efficiency of security 
procedures and security red tape through better integration among the different 
actors1 of a security system.  
Supply chains and information security have been of interest for scholars for decades. 
Great attention is paid to technical controls to information protection by devising and 
implementing tools to maintain the flows of high-quality data that ensures the 
smoothness and safety of information integration among different stakeholders of the 
supply chain. The information security is designed to minimize the risks arise in the 
information sharing, which may range from inconvenient (such as loss event 
happening) to catastrophic (Smith et al., 2007). Information security risk generally 
refers to the loss or degradation of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
information (Smith et al., 2007; Chellappa and Pavlou 2002; Gordon and Loeb 2002). 
These risks are minimized through proper information management which according 
to (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000) has three dimensions; technical (that focus on the 
automated components of the system such as computers, data networks), formal 
                                                     
1 Where actors refer to the port users and port service providers (Talley, 2009). The 
port users include sea- and land-based carriers as well as shippers and passengers. 
Service providers include port operators such as port authorities, terminal operators 
or terminal operating shipping lines as well as stevedores, ship agents, pilotage and 
towage, ship repair and maintenance, customs brokers, freight forwarders, third-
party logistics companies, including value-added services and warehousing, 




(that address the protection mechanisms implemented at the data sharing at the 
network level including policies, strategies, regulations and standard procedures), and 
informal (that stresses security at an individual level such as encouraging appropriate 
attitudes towards information protection and developing shared values and beliefs). 
In this framework, we have focused on all three aspects. The first two aspects i.e. 
technical and formal are described in detail whereas the informal aspect (third aspect) 
is addressed in terms of collaboration between different stakeholders particularly 
those involved in data sensing stage which is introduced through the use of Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) to encourage participants to share processed data to 
achieve the target of collaboration and ensure the integration in the information flow 
(Chow et al., 2007).  
 A conceptual framework to increase container security 
2.1 Introduction 
A number of studies highlight the growing importance of ports in the maritime trade 
as ports undertake a significant role in the logistics related activities in the Global 
transport systems (Notteboom, 2006;  Pettit and Beresford, 2009; Beresford et al., 
2011; Robinson, 2006). The port is actually a heterogeneous construct of actors, 
stakeholders, processes and functions (Herz and Flamig, 2014) that need to be 
integrated to design an effective and efficient container security system. We extend 
this premise in this study to all terminals since they pose significant nodes in trade 
flows, especially international.   
The concept of an integrated container security approach is based on the premise that 
key operational processes for logistics management should be efficiently and 
effectively integrated with container security management processes on the one hand 
and oversee the secure information flow among different stakeholders on the other 
hand. We propose a seamless Supply Chain Security Reference Framework (SCSRF) 
considers a Data Fusion Framework that addresses the container security with respect 
to different elements that constitute a complex container security network within 
which the main focus is capturing and processing secure data/information from and 
to all the relevant stakeholders in the value chain.  
According to Bass et al., (2012), a good architecture should be the product of a single 
architect or a small group of architects with an identified technical leader. Based on 
this concept the proposed framework has three small groups of architects; supply 
chain stakeholders, sources of data collection for the system and information flows 
for data processing which interacts with the technical leader – data fusion network as 







Figure 1 - Conceptual Supply Chain Security Reference Framework 
 
2.2 Supply Chain Stakeholders 
2.2.1 Customs and Border Agencies  
Customs and border agencies are the major stakeholders of the Supply chain security 
system who endeavour to improve the estimation process in their risk management 
approach (Koliousis, 2019) so as to reduce the associated risks. Fusing the above-
mentioned information is one of the options customs could use to get advanced alerts 
and to timely execute robust risk analytics. This gives customs the flexibility to identify 
specific, pre-flagged, containers and perform more detailed checks and inspections. 
In order to sufficiently perform this, consignments’ information should become 
available (Morrall et al., 2016) well before the containers arrive in the first port of 
entry. Entry Summary Declarations (ENS), Single Administrative Documents (SAD) and 
any such relevant information support consignment-oriented information for risk 
management rather than simply container-oriented information. The risk analysis is 
usually based on simple rule-based analytics (relational information, equal to, larger 
than, less than, not equal to, etc.) that pre-identify suspicious consignments.  
2.2.2 Freight and Transport companies  
As an important actor and stakeholder in the supply chain security, freight and 
transport companies aim at optimizing their freight throughput, thus are positively 
inclined to use live feeds from sensor networks. As a result, information sharing 
becomes critical not only in terms of operational excellence (Cane et al., 2012) but 
also from the value chain perspective. This information produces notifications not only 












features, shrinkage and tampering. That is why this should be a feature-rich and 
scalable framework which at the same time requires technology and information 
availability. This information can be complemented by or amended to electronic 
documentation in order to increase inspection efficiency. This information may also 
be used to optimize logistical planning and real-time re-planning, especially from a 
value chain perspective, since it enables real-time transport delay information.  
To this extent, freight companies need to fuse planning and status information to all 
relevant supply chain stakeholders, which should also be extended to relevant value 
chain stakeholders to increase efficiency. This information is stored in the 
ERPs/logistics systems, and the electronic messaging is disseminated (Cane et al., 
2012) to relevant freight companies, freight brokers, customs, port authorities, 
container sensor and GNSS/LRIT/AIS information storages to name but a few. 
Currently, the state of play is sharing raw sensor data (CONTAIN Consortium, 2011), 
nevertheless, the process upgrade should come from disseminating semantic or 
semantic-ready content from the sensor reports. Therefore, standardization of the 
fused data is a primary stakeholder’s need which is necessary in order to automate 
the event, situational pattern and situational awareness recognition. On the value 
chain level, information fusion and standardization is equally essential since the 
operator/decision-maker may improve the situational awareness on both the supply 
and the value chain level on an end-to-end basis, offering a more robust in terms of 
security assessment of consignments.  For example, streaming information compared 
to suspicious patterns could detect security events for containers (intrusion, 
movements, tampering, etc.) as well as an earlier warning, decreasing unnecessary 
and extra costs. 
2.2.3 Inter-connectivity among Stakeholders for Supply and Value Chain Resilience 
Stakeholders in extended supply and value chains are interested in optimizing their 
throughput and commercial efficiency. For example, cargo owners are not directly 
involved in the supply chain operations, however, they benefit from increasing the 
situational awareness.  In order not to open the system to non-relevant stakeholders 
and retain at the same time the reliability of the information, state-of-play approaches 
are utilizing Access Point concepts (SUPPORT Consortium, 2010) to perform 
stakeholder connectivity. We will define Supply Chain Access Point technology as “a 
system that disseminates predetermined information in the form of standardized 
short messages on an automated basis to a set of predetermined recipients without 
delays”. Access Points facilitate value chain stakeholders to communicate seamlessly 
using short messages without passing them through centralized platforms and allow 
an automated, explicitly pre-defined process. The communication embraces advanced 
security protocols so as to improve information security. 
Access Points benefits arise from their capability to provide singularity in a connected 
network of applications and to integrate data and dynamically push it to multiple 
recipients. The interconnectivity among different stakeholders using Data Fusion 






Figure 2 – Collaboration among Supply Chain Stakeholders: exchange of security messages 
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As per Figure 2, the organizations exchange different security messages and 
information with the Data Fusion System. This system undertakes a central role in this 
process by centralizing data collection, however on a pseudo-distributed basis. The 
Security Device Providers own and operate Supply Chain Security Devices as well as 
relevant onboard units that collect security-related messages and create alerts. The 
devices are installed onto vehicles, containers, etc. to monitor the supply chain 
services. Vessel Carrier and Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers are global 
container shipping companies that own and operate or just operate/collaborate fleets 
of ships and shipping containers. These entities require security alerts to more 
effectively execute the transport plan, thus they heavily rely on Security Devices 
Providers to get this information from. They use interfaces for consuming supply chain 
monitoring data which are pushed into their enterprise applications. Police Forces 
(including customs authorities) are law enforcement agencies with the responsibility 
of securing border/ perimeters,  carrying out immigration and customs controls, 
checking illegal activities etc. These authorities have been assigned to operate 
screening processes, checking documentation, collecting (sensitive) intelligence. 
Freight forwarders, on the other hand, manage the transfer of cargo thus they also 
need access to increased security awareness. Transport Operators undertake the 
movement of cargo and need also advanced security awareness.  
It can be easily understood that the proposed framework adopts a centralized 
approach for security messages. The Data Fusion Platform collects the messages from 
all related stakeholders and disseminates them to the respective parties. This 
approach facilitates rule-based or access-based sharing and pushing of information. 
For example, the data producer’s security domain may determine whether a given 
data consumer has access to the unprotected representation of a particular set of 
monitoring events. Data consumers may only have access to the unprotected 
monitoring events if both sub-domains allow them to.  
2.3 Data sensing, risk identification, assessment and response in value chains 
The main operational objective of custom organisations is to ensure the arriving cargo 
against legal, fiscal, tax, duty and criminal restrictions. Current risk management 
practices rely heavily on physical inspections, a practice that produces unnecessary 
inefficiencies in the entire value chain. Therefore, selecting a number of containers to 
be inspected, becomes critical in terms of increasing the effectiveness of the risk 
management system whereas a detailed 100% check is operationally unrealistic. 
Notably, there are exceptions to this sampling rule; from geographical restrictions like 
the case of imports to the USA to contextual restrictions like post-incident red level 
alerts. A number of selection criteria are indicated in different frameworks, like those 
stipulated in the SAFE Framework (Ireland, 2009). These criteria include country of 
origin, declared content, weight, value, volume, cross reference of information on 
Single Administrative Document (SAD) and Entry Summary Declaration (ENS). When 
the risk assessment is above preset thresholds, the container is isolated for inspection. 
Although most authorities are using advanced information sources, there is still a long 
way to go. Additional information that is often unnoticed during the risk estimation 
includes stakeholder originated information like Bill of Lading information, route 
selection, route deviation, security history information for the transport company, 
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ship crew information, truck driver history information, delays, etc. Although 
elements of this information might be sensitive, commercially or individually, 
competent authorities may request it and/or is already available on a voluntary basis. 
For example, the ConTraffic system (Joint Research Center of the European Union, 
2017; Varfis et al., 2011) stores and disseminates commercial information to 
participating authorities in the EU. EU Customs authorities primarily rely on the “Single 
Administrative Document” and on the “Entry Summary Declaration” as well as on 
commercial trade databases for the bill of ladings (collected from ports and relevant 
authorities around the world), including the C-Hawk system. Additionally, there are a 
number of relevant initiatives from Governmental Agencies like the C-TPAT (CBP, 
2016), the AEO (CP3 Group, 2016), (European Commission, 2016) the ISPS Code 
(International Maritime Organization, 2012) and the SOLAS Convention (International 
Maritime Organization, 2016). Since this paper focuses on the value chain aspects of 
security thus will not get into further security-related details of these systems.  
The relation between data sensing, risk identification, assessment and response is 
shown in Figure 3. This relationship diagram highlights a number of features in 
assessing the information flows where the process begins with Data Sensing from 
different sources. This information is assessed in order to estimate the Container Risk 
Index which in turn supports decision making (Risk & Loss assessment) for risk 
assessment and response. This relationship structure not only supports interactions 
among business entities but also the information interaction between business 
entities and governmental bodies and agencies.  
 
Figure 3 – Data sensing, risk identification, risk assessment and response in a value chain 
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In this simple relationship framework, the stakeholders from a value chain perspective 
may use either container with data sensing equipment or containers without data 
sensing equipment. Data flows contain relevant information that will help both 
agencies and stakeholders assess the risks and decide on the most appropriate 
mitigation and response strategies.  
2.4 Proposed Data Fusion Framework 
As can be easily understood from Figure 3, the seamless and timely exchange of 
relevant security information is of paramount importance to the success of any 
security response strategy. In order to facilitate this seamless and timely exchange of 
messages, we propose a Data Fusion Framework. The architecture (Figure 4) facilitates 
integration to either network-based, distributed systems or to conventional stand-
alone systems and adheres to common data fusion principles, including abstraction, 
data & task independence, parallel processing, synchronization and modularity. 
The framework considers components like sensors, algorithms and fusing procedures 
as black boxes, an approach that accelerates adoption and makes data flows more 
seamless. Additionally, each component is independently executable and even 
parallel with other components whereas the system as a whole is scalable as per the 
growing requirements. In terms of data needs, independent libraries semantically 
utilize events (e.g. threats) contextually both with and without data attributes. We will 
call this Middle-Level Data. This layout facilitates sorting high-level information 
automatically and in real-time making it extremely practical to constantly monitor 
specific events.  
This framework adopts a quasi-centred fusion and transformation process: on one 
side, the sensor network providing raw data and alerts to the Data Fusion Platform 
and on the other side, the Data Fusion Platform itself. With respect to the sensor 
network, industrial state-of-play has adopted (CONTAIN Consortium, 2011) the 
Container Security Device – CSD. Once a CSD is activated inside the container, it 
regularly collects data like temperature, pressure, humidity, light, CBRN attributes of 
the cargo.  
The Rule Engine collects and compares raw data with predefined values contributing 
to developing an environmental awareness status. Additionally, the Rule Engine 
includes authentication procedures to verify and validate the content sent therein. 
This subsystem runs on the backend real-time and supplies information to the 
workflow engine. Both Business to Business (B2B) and Business to Authorities (B2A) 
processes entail standardized messages. These messages are then received by the 
platform users and may be stored locally.  
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2.5 Information Flow and Supply Chain Security – Conceptual Architecture  
Supply chains and information security have been of interest for scholars for decades. 
Great attention is paid to technical controls to information protection by devising and 
implementing tools to maintain the flows of high-quality data that ensures the 
smoothness and safety of information integration among different stakeholders of the 
supply chain. The information security is designed to minimize the risks arise in the 
information sharing, which may range from inconvenient (such as loss event 
happening) to catastrophic (Smith et al., 2007). Information security risk generally 
refers to the loss or degradation of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
information (Smith et al., 2007; Chellappa and Pavlou 2002; Gordon and Loeb 2002). 
These risks are minimized through proper information management which according 
to Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) has three dimensions; technical (that focus on the 
automated components of the system such as computers, data networks), formal 
(that address the protection mechanisms implemented at the data sharing at the 
network level including policies, strategies, regulations and standard procedures), and 
informal (that stresses security at an individual level such as encouraging appropriate 
attitudes towards information protection and developing shared values and beliefs). 
In this framework we have focused on all the three aspects. The first two aspects i.e. 
technical and formal are described in conceptual architecture whereas the informal 
aspect (third aspect) is addressed in terms of collaboration between different 
stakeholders particularly those involved in data sensing stage (also described in detail 
earlier in section 2.2.3) which is introduced through the use of Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) to encourage participants to share processed data to achieve the 
target of collaboration and ensure the integration in the information flow (Chow et 
al., 2007).  
The fundamental architectural design for a software system emphasize the existence 
of a number of principles (Chen et al., 2013; Bass et al., 2012) to develop a robust, 
consistent and scalable system and more precisely, our proposed framework follows 
these principles:  
 Modularity: this is a critical aspect for developing complex security 
management systems that consist of different modules interacting in a non-
standard manner  
 Open Standards: an essential feature to enable more systems to be integrated 
 Interoperability: to efficiently and effectively connect distributed and 
heterogeneous systems 
 Scalability: to improve and extend the systems with new processes, 
workflows, technological advancements  
 Security: to balance collaboration among users yet restriction of sensitive 
information as well as dependability of information,  
 Privacy: since commercially sensitive information will be stored and handled 
on the cloud,  
 Reusability: of logic, processes, procedures, workflows so as to easily replicate 
existing sub-systems to be easily used by Supply Chain agents.  
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In order to exemplify the information flow and the interactions among the different 
stakeholders in the conceptual architecture, Figure 5 presents a simple scenario for 
the collaboration and the message exchange. The proposed Data Fusion Framework 
supports real-time exchange of directly connected data providers and is the basis of 
near-real time exchange of cloud connected external data providers. The exchange 
and collaboration of standard agnostic messages includes primarily GPS, Sensor Alerts, 
ERP Data, Commercial Data, Security Awareness Data, however this exchange is 
scalable and extendable. Furthermore, in the case of exchanging higher level 
messages, for example messages that have been handled to produce semantic 
information, the proposed system supports different protocols (including HTTP 
/HTTPS), and methods (including POST, REST, etc) so as to enable more value chain 
stakeholders engage with.  
 
Figure 5 – Information Flows Architectural Design 
The framework includes a network of sensors like GPS Devices, RFID, security sensors 
and onboard units that are configured to regularly send real-time data to the Data 
Fusion Platform. The platform collects these data as well as any security event and 
related activity for the entire container transport chain. Subsequently, the system 
calculates the risk levels and flags them for the user in a semantic approach.  
 
2.6 Case Study: Container Logistics Data & Security Information Exchange  
This section explains how the operational attributes of the proposed framework are 
implemented in the case study. The operational details of the information exchange 
among the different supply chain stakeholders are identified based on the  
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OASIS Universal Business Language (UBL) - Intermodal Freight Management process 
(Universal Business Language Committee, 2013). 
In its basic form, the Intermodal Freight Management process (Figure 6) entails three 
stages. The first stage, Planning, is where the transport demand is declared in a 
standardized format, and the Transport Service Providers plan their services 
accordingly. All support arrangements usually take place in this stage. In procedural 
terms, Transport Users and Transport Service Providers, develop a Transport 
Execution Plan which confirms all necessary transport details. With the finalization of 
the Transport Execution Plan, a Goods Item Itinerary is sent from the Transport Service 
Provider to the Transport User. The Goods Item Itinerary includes a number of 
information like the Packing Lists and also provides additional information related to 
the complete transport service. 
The second stage, Execution, contains (a) the physical transport of the cargo and (b) 
the exchange of supply chain related information. With respect to compliance, the 
Transport Service Providers exchange regulatory and compliance information with 
Regulators as well as receive information from Transport Network Managers. The 
Transport Progress Status message includes all pertinent information. 
The last stage, Completion, confirms delivery and exchange of reports among supply 
chain stakeholders. 
 
Figure 6 - A Generic Freight Management Process (Universal Business Language Committee, 2013) 
 
These three stages can be further mapped following the UBL conventions (Universal 
Business Language Committee, 2013) encompassing key Intermodal Freight 
Management messages including the Transport Service Description, Transport Service 
Description Request, Transport Execution Plan, Transport Execution Plan Request, 
Transportation Status, Transportation Status Request, Transport Progress Status, 
Transport Progress Status Request, Goods Item Itinerary, and Freight Invoice. The 
Transport Execution Plan message is sent by a transport user to request a transport 
service from a transport service provider. The Goods Item Itinerary message provides 
details relating to a transport service, such as transport movement, identification of 
transport equipment, identification of transported goods, subcontracted service 
providers, packing lists, etc. The Transportation Status - TS message disseminates 
reports of the transportation status and/or of event changes. In terms of the structure 
of the messages, we follow the Common Reporting Schema (CONTAIN Consortium, 
2011) providing structure in sharing compliance and regulation related information 
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A standardized order to relevant regulatory authorities to stop a load 
unit and further examine it. 
Source: Adapted from (CONTAIN Consortium, 2011) 
In order to explain in more detail the messages that the different supply chain 
stakeholders exchange, an actual operational case is presented in Figure 7. This is a 
simple case, where the supply chain stakeholders interact with one another sharing 
messages and making decisions based on this information. More precisely, the 
Logistics Service Provider pushes different messages to the relevant stakeholders and 
to the Data Fusion Platform. The objective is to report effectively and sufficiently 
different states as well as different relevant transport information the earliest 
possible.  A trigger point is then appearing in this process and initiates a decision point 
where the transport chain providers (part of the value chain stakeholders) choose to 
amend the Transport Execution Plan if this is considered necessary.  
For example, one task is the monitoring of the condition of the cargo, which may be 
the trigger event that informs the Transport Execution Status message. This task 
includes the collection, the registration and the control of environmental conditions 
data like the temperature, the humidity, the pressure, the light / infrared light, the 
acoustic and the pressure inside by the CSD and the sending of the message to the 
Data Fusion Platform. When the CSD is activated after a cargo condition event triggers 
it, the platform starts collecting this data in order to inform and adapt the Transport 
Execution Plan. From a value chain perspective, this informs the different stakeholders 
to adapt their activities and their operational actions. Depending on the developed 
solution, alarms are generated and transmitted on either a centralized or a distributed 
basis through the Data Fusion Platform. An information security structure ensures that 
only authenticated stakeholders can send and receive information, whereas validation 
is executed both centrally and locally (in the distributed manner).  
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 Conclusions 
 
The introduction of security monitoring and inspection processes are a reality in 
modern supply chains. Considering this reality, this paper has addressed how we can 
improve the supply chain efficiency with the presence of such security initiatives. 
Security-related data is needed on a real-time basis and a system that can adequately 
support this will support security procedures more effectively. Keeping this in view, 
this research proposes a simple framework that facilitates improved security for data 
sharing among supply chain stakeholders by providing rule/principles based access to 
security information in real-time that enables not only the optimization of the supply 
chain but more importantly improves the data security level. 
The proposed conceptual framework is expected to improve overall value in the 
supply chain through the innovative data fusion network that will: 
• improve supply chain planning upstream and downstream; 
• reduce administrative red tape; 
• improve security levels; 
• improve supply chain integration through the improved monitoring of the 
cargo integrity; 
• increase flexibility to cope with increasing trade volumes; 
• increase trader trust throughout the value chain; 
• improve transaction and turnaround times in ports, terminals, inland 
terminals; 
• reduce administrative compliance activities and processes 
• decreased fraud 
• to improve collaboration and interoperability with other border agencies and 
enforcement organizations. 
 Policy & Research Recommendations 
Developing mechanisms to effectively share information among different 
stakeholders of the security system is a domain with high value therefore, future 
research should provide more empirical data to assess the value of different security 
mechanisms in the supply chains. Additionally, there is need to undertake more 
research on the reengineering of the processes to minimize the impacts of security 
incidents because this is one of the greatest challenges in supply chain security. This 
paper proposes a simple solution to a complex reality however, more advanced data 
fusion frameworks should be explored. 
With respect to policy implications of the research, this framework requires a top-
down approach so as to be further exploited. The security domain is heavily regulated 
and as such, centrally imposed decisions enable better usage of such frameworks. 
Nevertheless, the main tradeoff that has to be decided is whether the sharing of 
security information may reduce the value and additionally which rules may be 
adopted to retain this value. In any case, experience has shown (as expressed in the 
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case study) that spreading information to trusted parties, improves the overall 
security level. 
 Glossary  
AEO Authorized Economic Operator 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
CSD Container Security Device 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
ENS Entry Summary Declaration 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
ICS Import Control System 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IIP Integrated Information Platform 
ISPS Code International Ship and Port Security Code 
LRIT Long-Range Identification and Tracking 
RFID Radio Frequency IDentification 
SAD Single Administrative Document 
SCSF Supply Chain Security Framework 
 
 Disclaimer 
Part of this work is based on the CONTAIN Project which was funded by the European 
Commission under the FP7/SEC/2010/1/261679 Contract.  
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